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THE U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE IMPASSE:
TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS
Michael F. McBride and Robin M. Rotman ∗
For several years there has been an impasse, in the
political branches, over how to make progress on dealing
with the intractable problem of nuclear waste disposal in
the United States. Currently, over 120 sites, spread across
39 states, host commercial spent fuel—many of these sites
are former reactors that have become de facto interim
nuclear waste storage sites, pending a permanent solution.10
Transportation considerations are central in this discussion.
With the potential for Congress to make progress on this
issue following the 2018 midterm elections, this article
reviews the potential paths forward and considers possible
implications for the transportation sector.

Michael F. McBride is a partner at Van Ness Feldman, LLP, with over 40 years of
experience in nuclear regulatory matters. He may be reached at 202-298-1989, or
mfm@vnf.com. Mike’s practice focuses on litigation, arbitration, mediation, and
negotiations involving transportation, energy, and environmental issues. Mike served as
outside counsel to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future from
2010–2012, and as counsel to the Bipartisan Policy Center's Nuclear Waste Initiative
from 2014–2016.
Robin M. Rotman is counsel at Van Ness Feldman, LLP, focusing on energy and
transportation infrastructure finance and development. She may be reached at
202-298-1836, or rmr@vnf.com. Robin has experience structuring transactions,
negotiating project agreements and documentation, and representing clients in related
litigation and administrative actions. Robin is also an Assistant Professor at the
University of Missouri, where she teaches energy and environmental law.
The authors thank Senior Paralegal Specialist Claire Brennan for her valuable research
assistance.
A version of a portion of article previously appeared in Nuclear Engineering
International.
10 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act 2018, Frequently Asked Questions About
H.R. 3053 and Nuclear Waste, at 1, https://energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/NWPAA_FAQ_05072018.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
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How Did We Get Here?
Shortly after the dawn of the nuclear age, it became
apparent that waste would be created that would have long
half-lives and therefore require long-term isolation to
protect human health and the environment. Consideration
was given to a wide range of options—including disposing
of the waste in an abandoned salt mine in Kansas, sending
it to outer space, or even putting it at the bottom of the
ocean. All were rejected for various geologic and technical
reasons.
In 1982, with the support of the nuclear industry,
Congress took a major step toward a solution, enacting the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”).11 The NWPA
committed the federal government to taking title to, and
responsibility for, disposal of commercial spent fuel, in
addition to the defense wastes for which it was already
responsible. Congress recognized that, as a practical
matter, only the federal government has the ability to
oversee permanent nuclear waste disposal. The NWPA
required the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to evaluate
potential sites for permanent, underground disposal of highlevel nuclear waste, subject to licensing by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), and appropriated funds
for this purpose.
The NWPA required DOE to begin accepting
commercial spent fuel by January 31, 1998.12 DOE entered
into enforceable contracts with NRC reactor licensees
Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–
10270).
12 Id. § 302(a)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 2258.
11
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(“Licensees”) to carry out its responsibilities, which
prescribed that generators pay a fee of 1.0 mil/kwh from
nuclear-generated electricity to fund disposal activities. 13
Initially, sites in as many as ten States were under
consideration for a repository. Over time, DOE narrowed
the list to Nevada, Texas, and the State of Washington. In
1987, Congress determined that the sites in Texas and
Washington were too politically sensitive. In what has
come to be referred to in Nevada media as the “Screw
Nevada Bill,” Congress amended the NWPA to direct DOE
to evaluate only Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a possible
disposal site (“Yucca Mountain Project” or “Project”), and
thereafter Congress provided appropriations specifically for
the Project.14
When it became clear that DOE would not meet its
obligation to begin accepting commercial spent fuel by
January 31, 1998, a number of States and Licensees sued
for specific performance, i.e., to get a court to force DOE to
accept the spent fuel.15 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) found that
DOE was in violation of NWPA by refusing to accept
commercial spent fuel. 16 Because the federal government
lacked a place where it could safely accept the spent fuel,
the D.C. Circuit did not force DOE to start accepting spent
fuel, but instead suggested that the Licensees could pursue
Id. § 302(a)(3), 96 Stat. 2258; 42 U.S.C. § 10222.
See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 §§ 5001–5065,
101 Stat. 1330, 1330–227 to –255.
15 See, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996); N. States
Power Co. v. DOE, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. DOE, 211 F.
3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 653
(2006), rev’d, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
16 Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1276.
13
14
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damages before the U.S. Court of Claims.17 The U.S.
Court of Claims found that DOE was in breach of the
contracts with Licensees regarding nuclear waste disposal,
and ordered DOE to pay damages to the Licensees to
reimburse their costs of storing spent fuel on-site at their
facilities.18 Payment is made out of the Judgment Fund, a
permanent appropriation by Congress to pay judgments
entered against the United States.19 The longer the waste
sits, the more the government will need to compensate
Licensees for its inaction. Recent reports are that the
government’s annual liability for these damages is
approximately $800 million,20 and that amount will
continue to increase.
DOE Makes Progress—For a Time
In February 2002, DOE released its assessment of the
suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, concluding that the
site was safe for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear
waste.21 President George W. Bush accepted DOE’s
analysis and determined that DOE should proceed with
Yucca Mountain as the site of the nation’s nuclear

See N. States Power, 128 F.3d at 759-60.
Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 739, 745-48 (2010),
reconsideration denied, 101 Fed. Cl. 464 (2011), aff’d, 711 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
19 Mark Holt, Congressional Research Service, RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste
Disposal 12 (updated Sept. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33461.pdf.
20 See Nuclear Energy Institute, Used Nuclear Fuel https://www.nei.org/advocacy/makeregulations-smarter/used-nuclear-fuel (last visited Nov. 26, 2018); see also DOE, Agency
Financial Report, at 78 (FY 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/05/f51/
fy-2017-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf.
21 See DOE, Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain,
Nye County, Nevada (Feb. 2002), https://www.energy.gov/nepa/downloads/eis-0250final-environmental-impact-statement.
17
18
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repository.22 Under the NWPA, however, the Governor of
Nevada had a right to veto the Project, subject to a
Congressional override. 23 Governor Kenny Guinn
exercised Nevada’s veto right, but Congress overrode the
veto, and continued to appropriate funds for the Project. 24
As a result, DOE was able to proceed and, in 2008, filed its
application with the NRC for a Project license. 25
The Obama Administration, however, opposed the
Project as “not a workable option”—a position that the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and others
have characterized as a policy decision, not based on
technical or safety factors. 26 In March 2010, DOE filed a
motion with the NRC to withdraw its license application.27
The move was applauded by then-Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid (D-NV), a long-time opponent of the Project.
In June 2010, the NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board (“ASLB”) denied the motion 3-0, on grounds that
the NWPA did not authorize DOE to withdraw the license
application without Congressional approval. 28 Despite the
ASLB Decision, in October 2010, then-Chairman of the
See Matthew L. Wald, Bury the Nation’s Nuclear Waste in Nevada, Bush Says, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 16, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/us/bury-the-nation-snuclear-waste-in-nevada-bush-says.html.
23 NWPA §§ 115(b), 115(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135(b), 10135(c).
24 See Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002) (approving the site at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive
waste and spent nuclear fuel, pursuant to the NWPA).
25 See generally NRC, DOE’s License Application for a High-Level Waste Geologic
Repository at Yucca Mountain (June 3, 2008), https://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/
yucca-lic-app.html.
26 See GAO, Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of the Yucca
Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned, at 11-13 (Apr. 2011), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/320/317627.pdf.
27 See DOE’s Motion to Withdraw, In re DOE, NRC 63-001-HLW (Mar. 3, 2010), https://
www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1006/ML100621397.pdf.
28 See In re DOE, 71 NRC 609, 618-30 (2010) (“ASLB Decision”), pet. for review
dismissed, In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011), subsequent mandamus
proceeding, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
22
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NRC, Gregory Jaczko, ordered the Staff to terminate
review of the application and not spend the remaining
funds that had been appropriated for the NRC licensing
proceeding.29 At that time, the NRC had over $11 million
remaining in appropriated funds that it had not spent. In
September 2011, the Commission split 2-2 on appeal,
leaving the ASLB Decision in effect under NRC rules.30
Because of the apparent determination of DOE to
terminate the Project, several parties with interests in longterm nuclear waste disposal sought judicial relief, including
Aiken County, South Carolina as the named lead petitioner
(home to the Savannah River nuclear production site) and
the State of Washington (home to the Hanford Reservation
DOE nuclear weapons site). 31 Their first effort, against
President Obama, DOE and NRC, did not succeed. Yet
then-Judge Brown, in a concurring opinion, suggested that
the Petitioners could instead move to compel agency action
unlawfully delayed, given the NRC’s inaction.32 The
Petitioners did so. Eventually, the D.C. Circuit took the
rare step of issuing a writ of mandamus, compelling the
NRC to use the remaining appropriated funds on Project
licensing proceedings.33 Separately, the same Court also
suspended the NWPA Program Fee, on the grounds that the
agency could not produce an adequate assessment of the
See Memorandum to Office Directors and Regional Administrators From J.E. Dyer,
Chief Financial Officer, NRC, Guidance Under a Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing
Resolution (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.thenwsc.org/ym/
YM%20NRC.CFO%20Memo%20to%20Staff%20re%20CR%20100410.pdf; see also
725 F.3d at 267-68 (Randolph, J., concurring) (citing NRC, Office of the Inspector
General, OIG Case No. 11-05, NRC Chairman’s Unilateral Decision to Terminate NRC’s
Review of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License Application (June 6, 2011)).
30 See In re DOE, 74 NRC 368 (2011); see also In re DOE, 74 NRC 212 (2011).
31 In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428.
32 See id. at 438.
33 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d at 266.
29
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appropriate amount of the fee in light of numerous
uncertainties.34 The D.C. Circuit also upheld the NRC’s
“Continued Storage Rule,” which permits on-site storage of
commercial spent fuel for the indefinite future, finding that
the NRC had a rational basis and substantial evidence for
its conclusion that it would be safe to continue to store
spent fuel indefinitely at reactor sites. 35
In compliance with the writ of mandamus, the NRC
resumed work on the Project licensing proceeding, issuing
a Safety Evaluation Report and a Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement. At present, the funds
have mostly been expended, and the NRC has informed
Congress that it would need approximately $330 million to
complete the Project licensing.36 The D.C. Circuit’s writ of
mandamus does not require the NRC to perform unfunded
work.
To date, Congress has not appropriated any additional
funds. That is where matters stand on the Yucca Mountain
Project—it is stalled because Congress has been unable to
agree on additional appropriations.
Meanwhile….
Although the Obama Administration opposed the
Project, it attempted to address the nuclear waste issue by
creating the “Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future” (“BRC”), an advisory committee to the
Secretary of Energy. The BRC published a report in
Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
New York v. NRC, 824 F.3d 1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
36 See Holt, supra, note 10, at 2 & n.9 (at 2 & n.9) (citing 2015 Congressional testimony
of NRC Chairman Burns)
34
35
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January 2012.37 As directed by the Secretary of Energy, the
BRC did not opine on any particular site for nuclear waste
disposal, nor did it opine on the merits of the Project in
particular. It did support geologic disposal of nuclear waste
by the federal government and, among other things,
supported what it termed “consent-based siting,” in the
wake of Nevada’s staunch opposition to the Project.38
In December 2015, DOE launched efforts to promote
consent-based siting, and held meetings around the country
to encourage a State to volunteer to host a nuclear waste
disposal site in exchange for money and other benefits. In
the wake of the BRC Report, the Bipartisan Policy Center
started its “Nuclear Waste Initiative,” pursuant to which it
issued a series of white papers and a report endorsing
consent-based siting.
Transportation Implications
Safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel is a key
component of the nuclear waste solution. The vast majority
of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste that is moved
in the United States is transported by rail. Although there
has never been a release of high-level nuclear waste when
transported in an NRC-approved spent fuel storage cask,
public opposition to nuclear waste disposal sites often
focuses on perceived transportation risks.
With respect to the Yucca Mountain Project, a large
volume of spent nuclear fuel would be transported to the
Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of
Energy (Jan. 2012) (“BRC Report”), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/
brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
38 See id. at 47-59.
37
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site over the course of many years, shipped predominantly
by rail, and to a much lesser extent, by truck. Nevada state
officials lament that a rail line that would carry spent
nuclear fuel to the site passes within a half-mile of the Las
Vegas Strip. A train derailment with a subsequent release
of nuclear materials (even though that is an exceedingly
improbable event) could expose railroad employees, first
responders, residents and visitors to high levels of
radiation.39 The volume and frequency of shipments, even
without a release, could also generate concerns for
transportation workers in the Las Vegas area, who may
require radiation exposure monitoring.
Some Yucca Mountain opponents argue for
decentralized repositories so that waste does not need to be
transported as far. To the extent that transportation of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is transported
fewer miles as a result of having more than one disposal
site, the transportation risk would necessarily be less
because the overall miles the spent fuel would be
transported would be less. Whether there are other risks
that might increase in such a scenario—such as whether
having more than one repository increases overall risk—
depends on the comparative assessment of risks associated
with the particular sites, and would have to be considered
by the NRC during licensing of each specific site.

See Bobby Magill, Nevadans Prep for Yucca Battle Even as Funding Faces Long Odds,
Bloomberg Environment, June 25, 2018, https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/nevadans-prep-for-yucca-battle-even-as-funding-faces-longodds.
39
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A Continued Impasse?
For several years, it was thought in Washington, D.C.
that the unwillingness of Congress to appropriate further
funds for the Yucca Mountain Project licensing proceeding
was due to the political clout of Harry Reid (D-NV), the
then-Senate Majority Leader. Some lawmakers assumed
that when Harry Reid left the Senate, the Yucca Mountain
Project would go through. The election of President Trump
bolstered these assumptions. Although President Trump
did not take a position on the Yucca Mountain Project
during the 2016 elections, he has largely appeared to
support the Project, and his proposed budget for 2019
recommended that Congress appropriate approximately
$48 million to NRC, and $120 million to DOE, to resume
Project licensing activities. 40 Further, on May 10, 2018, the
House passed, by a 340-72 vote, legislation (H.R. 3053) to
amend the NWPA, provide funding for the Project, and
promote centralized interim storage of commercial spent

See Dep’t of Energy FY 2019 Budget Request Fact Sheet at 3 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f48/
Energy%20Department%20FY%202019%20Budget%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf; Press
Release, NRC, NRC Proposes FY 2019 Budget to Congress (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2018/18-005.pdf; see also Office of
Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, An American Budget, Fiscal
Year 2019, at 45-48, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budgetfy2019.pdf. But note that on October 20, 2018, while in Nevada campaigning for Sen.
Dean Heller (R-NV), President Trump stated during a television interview: “I think you
should do things where people want them to happen, so I would be very inclined to be
against [the Project].” He remarked that “[w]e will be looking at it very seriously over
the next few weeks, and I agree with the people of Nevada.” Seung Min Kim, Trump
Signals Opposition to Nuclear Waste Site in Nevada Despite His Budget Proposals to
Fund It, The Washington Post, Oct. 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-signals-opposition-to-nuclear-waste-site-in-nevada-despite-his-budget-proposalsto-fund-it/2018/10/21/50eff246-d571-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html?utm_term=.
718bb8e02ba5&wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1. On October 26, 2018, Energy Secretary
Rick Perry reiterated President Trump’s support for the Yucca Mountain Project. See Ari
Natter and Brian Eckhouse, Perry Says White House Still Backs Nevada Nuclear Dump,
Bloomberg, updated Oct. 27, 2018 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-10-26/energy-secretary-says-white-house-still-backs-nevada-nuke-dump.
40
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fuel while the Project is under consideration (and,
eventually, construction, if licensed by the NRC).
But yet the Project still seems to be going nowhere fast.
Why?
It turns out that “The Trouble with Harry” became “The
Trouble with Mitch,” i.e., Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the
current Senate Majority Leader. Leader McConnell had a
majority of only 51-49 heading into the 2018 elections, and
wanted to maintain, or grow, the Republican majority if at
all possible. He reportedly did not allow the Project to
come up for an appropriations vote in the run-up to the
2018 midterms, in an effort to allow Senator Dean Heller
(R-NV), a long-time opponent of the Project, to score
political points with his Nevada constituency by continuing
to claim to block the Project. 41 Indeed, during his
campaign, Senator Heller took credit for ensuring that a
Yucca Mountain Project licensing funding request by DOE
and NRC was excluded from the Energy and Water,
Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans
Affairs appropriations bill passed by the Senate in June
2018.42 He also touted successful efforts in removing a $30
million Project appropriation from the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. 43
Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL) lamented that “As we’ve allowed for a decade now, a single
senator’s short-term political calculations again triumphed over long-term, bipartisan
policy priorities.” Gary Martin, Congressman: Political Considerations Derailing Yucca
Mountain, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Sept. 12, 2018, https://www.reviewjournal.com/
news/politics-and-government/nevada/congressman-political-considerations-derailingyucca-mountain/.
42 See Press Release, Dean Heller, U.S. Senator for Nevada, Heller Successfully Keeps
Funding for Yucca Mountain Out of Appropriations Bill Approved by the U.S. Senate
(June 25, 2018), https://www.heller.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/6/hellersuccessfully-keeps-funding-for-yucca-mountain-out-of-appropriations-bill-approved-bythe-u-s-senate.
43 See id.
41
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Despite these efforts, Senator Heller was defeated in the
2018 midterms by Congresswoman Jacky Rosen (D-NV),
who also opposes the Project.
With the 2018 elections now behind us, the question
remains: Will Congress finally break the impasse? Or will
it find another excuse to again avoid this nettlesome issue?
Given the strong Congressional support the Project has
enjoyed in the past, given that geologic disposal is the
preferred technical means of dealing with the nuclear waste
problem, given that the federal government has already
spent approximately $11 billion on the Project,44 and given
that DOE’s obligations to pay Licensees’ on-site storage
costs already has amounted to at least $6.9 billion, and may
eventually exceed $34 billion, 45 it is widely believed that
Congress will appropriate funds for the Project after the
2018 midterm elections. But the long and troubled history
of the Project suggests caution in relying on that belief.
At some point, though, Congress must appropriate
funds to do something about nuclear waste storage and
disposal.

See American Legislative Exchange Council, Resolution Urging the President and
Congress to Abide by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to Establish a Permanent
Geologic Repository for Used Nuclear Fuel and Defense-Related High-Level Radioactive
Waste (finalized Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/resolution-urging-thepresident-and-congress-to-abide-by-the-nuclear-waste-policy-act-of-1982-to-establish-apermanent-geologic-repository-for-used-nuclear-fuel-and-defense-related-high-levelradioact/.
45 See Holt, supra, note 10, at 12 & n.57; see also id. at 42 (others predicted that future
damages could rise by tens of billions of dollars more if the federal disposal program fails
altogether).
44
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